The changes associated with the globalising international economy have had significant effects on the nature and functions of national states. Rather than being in a process of decline in both relevance and effectiveness, the state remains central to the study of IPE and to processes of transformation at the national, regional and global levels. The process of globalisation has created a situation which we can call the 'paradox of state power', in which the national state is simultaneously weakened and strengthened. In the Latin American case, the 'internationalisation of the state' was engineered very consciously by government elites as a means of using international constraints to overcome domestic constraints. As a result of the location of significant decision-making authority at the regional and global levels, and also as a result of the changing policy environment associated with financial globalisation, the policymaking options available to national governments were significantly diminished. On the other hand, the 'internationalisation of the state' provided precisely the conditions in which the state was able to recompose itself and recover its coherence vis-à-vis societal interests following the conditions of economic and political collapse which characterised the region at the end of the 1980s. In this way, state power was simultaneously weakened at the global level, as a result of the changing structures of rewards and punishments in the international economy, and strengthened at the domestic level as a result of the space created by the internationalisation of the state for the consolidation of economic and political reform.
In the bulk of commentary on the effects of the globalisation of economic and financial activity 1 , the national state has been assumed to have withered or else taken a backseat to global and national markets as the primary mechanism for the distribution of resources and welfare. 2 In this conception, states and markets are pitted against each other in a zero-sum game which, according to the dominant neoliberal orthodoxy, can only be resolved in favour of the latter if countries and governments are to achieve competitiveness and credibility in the globalised international economy. In addition, the battle for 'authority' in the international political economy has been depicted as a situation in which the state is losing ground to a variety of new, non-state, transnational actors such as financial agents, non-governmental organisations, firms, social movements and professional associations. Again, the image is one of a zero-sum situation in which the dispersion (and 'transnationalisation') of political and economic authority necessarily has involved the increasing redundancy of its traditional locus.
Such arguments, however, are increasingly being contested. Recent contributions to the IPE literature have been at pains to refute the idea that the state and its capabilities have withered as a result of global economic integration and the formation of nonstate, transnational identities and activities. Similarly, the notion that globalisation has generated a harmonisation between national states in terms of policy preferences, expectations, welfare standards, cultural identities, and so on -the so-called 'convergence thesis' -has been challenged by analyses which identify significantly different development trajectories and policy strategies in regions and countries within the globalising international system. 3 Some of these accounts take as their starting points an observation of the composition of state and political capabilities in different regions or countries 4 ; others the limits of the market and constraints on its 'power' in a wider sense. 5 These analytical currents collectively amount to a backlash against what has been termed the 'phenomenon of state denial' in recent IPE and political science. 6 A number of different conceptual tools have been elaborated for the purposes of refuting the argument that the national state is becoming redundant, both with respect to governance at the domestic level and in terms of the action and interaction of agents in the 'global' arena. The most salient of these has been the notion of the 'competition state', which is discussed in a later section of the paper. This and related concepts seek to identify the ways in which the nature of the state, its capabilities and activities has undergone a process of change or redefinition rather than a process of deterioration.
This paper aims to feed into such recent currents in the study of IPE and globalisation in two ways. The first is by addressing one of the major shortcomings of recent theoretical currents, namely a lack of empirical specificity. The theoretical literature does not, perhaps by its very nature, give sufficient attention what happens at the 'sharp end' of globalisation and the concrete ways in which its effects manifest themselves at the national level. The application of IPE perspectives to the case of the Latin American region has been particularly sparse in this respect.
Second, and more fundamentally, it offers a conceptual formulation which seeks to extend and tighten the somewhat imprecise metaphor of the 'competition state', which will be termed the 'paradox of state power'. The argument runs as follows. On one hand, as global finance and transnational actors are increasingly dominant in international economic activity, states are seen to be controlled by markets and marketoriented imperatives. Both governments' room for manoeuvre and the range of policy options available in the context of globalisation are vastly reduced, making impossible talk of 'national' economic policy or autonomous processes of policy choice. This is a result of a fundamental shift in the structure of rewards and punishments in the international economy as a result of globalisation. In this sense, globalisation increases the imperative of conformity with the new international policy agenda, and at the same time vastly increases the costs of non-conformity. The 'internationalisation' of the state 7 , which results from both the effects of globalisation and purposive domestic policies, in turn removes policy instruments from the direct control of national governments. Policy reforms are 'locked in' by engagement with the agents of the globalised international economy (particularly the agents of international finance), the negotiation of binding agreements with international financial institutions, and the establishment of regional commitments.
In effect, governments have very deliberately used international constraints to overcome domestic constraints, characterised in the Latin American context by widespread economic crisis. Paradoxically, therefore, the 'power' of the state is enhanced by the same processes which are assumed to undermine its authority. By locating direct decision-making responsibility outside the boundaries of the state, or alternatively 'locking in' the economic agenda by the above means, the state has been able to re-compose itself and recover its coherence vis-à-vis societal interests. In the Latin American and other contexts, this has translated into a recovery of state strength and possibilities for centralised government with enhanced policy-making capabilities.
Thus, the state becomes simultaneously more and less 'powerful' under the impact of globalisation: policy-making autonomy in the international arena diminishes as a result of globalisation, but as a direct result of this its strength in the domestic arena increases. This is the essence of the 'paradox of state power'.
The empirical observation of the Latin American region thus gives substance to the contention that 'state denial' is indeed a 'fundamentally Anglo-American institution' which, moreover, has been over-generalised in globalisation theory. 8 Despite the vulnerability of Latin American countries to changes in the global economy and the activities of the international financial institutions, the process of policy-making and the mode of social organisation in Latin America remains in most cases still highly statist in nature, and political power significantly centralised. The development project, which has come to rest firmly on engagement with globalised economic and financial activity, remains dependent on the institutionalisation of certain policies and structures by means of state and government action. Although unfashionable, the study of the state therefore remains fundamental to an understanding of contemporary Latin American political economy, and to the study of IPE and globalisation more generally. The 'paradox' thus feeds into recent revisionist literature which challenges the relegation of the state in IPE and also the retreat of the state in empirical terms. By using Latin
American countries as case studies of dominant theoretical and empirical contentions,
we can move towards a more detailed and nuanced understanding of each. To place these observations in the theoretical context of the present discussion, then, it is the contention of the present paper that an important neglected dimension of the This imperative for conformity can be traced to a fundamental change in the structure of rewards and punishments in the international economy as a result of the primacy of investment flows and the internationalisation of economic activity.
Conceptions of state power
Such developments in the international economy and in the international policy community have been termed 'embedded financial orthodoxy' 11 which has been regarded as the successor to the system of 'embedded liberalism'. 12 In this conception, finance has become the lifeblood of the international economy and, by extension, an essential nutrient for growth in the national and international context. The predominance or 'hegemony' of international capital is seen to have a structural autonomy which carries far greater weight than states and in effect controls state actions. This feeds into the 'transnationalisation' debate which perceives the international economy to be dominated increasingly by 'non-state' actors (most obviously transnational corporations, non-governmental organisations and transnational social movements) rather than by states as traditionally conceived. The activity of these 'new' actors is seen to challenge state authority and state autonomy in policy making terms, creating a new international structure in which states and national boundaries are increasingly irrelevant. 13 It may well be that the new hegemonic power in the post-hegemonic era is global finance. Even non-Gramscian analysis can appreciate that finance has probably become, or is well on its way to becoming, the foundation of the global economic system, or, in Cerny's terms, 'the infrastructure of the infrastructure'. 14 The second 'leg': the reinforcement of state power
The policy prescriptions of the neoliberal agenda are, in effect, the 'rules' by which the game is played. The 'game' itself, however, is about the pursuit of international competitiveness, and conformity with the rules ensures that the game is played to maximum effect. As a result of globalisation, then, there has been a fundamental change in the nature of competition between states, which has involved the reorganisation of the state away from its more traditional 'welfare' function towards a role that can be classified as the pursuit of national competitiveness. The idea of the 'competition state' is characterised by two principal elements: (a) an overriding belief that national competitiveness is the means of achieving economic growth and improved living standards, and (b) a shift from principally demand-side to supply-side measures in governments' competitive policies. 18 In the terms used above, these would correspond to (a) the nature of the game itself, and (b) the (policy-based) rules by which the game is played. In broader terms, the traditional bases of the interactions of states in the international arena -that is, competition for territory or control over territorially-bound natural resources -have been superseded by a new competitive 'game' in which the rewards are world market shares. The corollary of this observation is that 'industrial policy and trade policy are becoming more important than defence and foreign policy'.
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From this preliminary conceptual starting point, it is clear that the argument that globalisation is associated with a dispersion of state power, especially in terms of the 'loss of sovereignty' to markets and to global and regional institutions, is not necessarily incompatible with a revitalisation of the state from a more 'national'
perspective. 20 While the state may well be experiencing a withering of its existing competencies, the strategies of adaptation that it employs in order to respond to processes of change become paramount. 21 In this sense, the primary traditional 
It becomes clear, then, that Hirst and Thompson's argument in Globalization in
Question that 'one key effect of the concept of globalisation has been to paralyse radical reforming national strategies, to see them as unviable in the face of the judgement and sanction of international markets' 22 is inaccurate, in that it assumes that radically reformist national policies go against the grain of economic globalisation.
Hirst and Thompson's arguments appear to apply only to those countries in which a functioning market economy is already in place, and in which radical reforming national strategies would necessarily be in an opposite direction. In the case of Latin American countries, the radical reform process has been oriented in recent years towards the construction of a functioning market economy, through an extensive process of neoliberal reform, and for this reason has moved in a direction highly compatible with that of international markets. The economic policy revolution in Latin America is certainly 'radical', and indeed driven and facilitated by globalisation in the international arena.
In the context, therefore, of widespread political and economic crisis in a variety of countries, globalisation can be seen to have had a positive effect, at least in the short term, for those concerned with the reconstruction of state power. The term 'the rescue of the nation-state', borrowed from Alan Milward's analysis of the development of European integration, seems to be highly applicable. 23 In Milward's original formulation, the post-war reconstruction of European states was based on the perception that certain policy issues could be addressed better at the regional than at the national level, given the condition of the national settings in question and, in some cases, the nature of the issues. If we take this as a loose idea rather than an interpretation to the letter, it can be used to shed further light on the 'paradox of state power' and on the Latin American cases.
First, globalisation created the situation in which the state was able to pursue those reform strategies which would relieve the political and economic crisis in which it found itself embroiled, both by creating an element of external legitimacy and an impression of external compulsion, and also by offering a new basis for political and economic strategy at a time when previous development models had been exhausted.
The costs of non-conformity, as mentioned earlier, are a powerful justification for adjustment. Second, the consolidation of neoliberalism and integration into the international economy entailed the 'internationalisation' of the state. As such, the conditions of state and economic crisis were alleviated through the removal of direct policy-making authority from the state to the globalised international economy and, in the case of the Mercosur countries particularly, to the regional level. In this way, the direction of reform and specific policy measures were accorded a certain 'irreversibility' as a result of their insertion into currents of international economic change. The Convertibility Plan in Argentina, by which the peso was pegged at a 1:1 parity with the US dollar and mandatory dollar backing required for the domestic monetary base, is a clear example: Economy Minster Domingo Cavallo's suggestions in late 1991 and early 1992 of modifying the exchange rate system were effectively vetoed by the hostile reaction of the markets to his proposals. 24 The 'internationalisation' of the state thus served to 'rescue' it from the overwhelming constraints on economic policy and neoliberalism at the domestic level, which in many cases stemmed largely from political pressures on the policy-making processes. The clearest example of this pattern can be found in Argentina. Throughout the post-war period macroeconomic consistency was subordinated to political struggle between the state and corporatist societal interests, particularly labour and the military. Both of these groups exercised a significant veto power over the political process, the former through activism and militancy and the latter through frequent military coups. The threat of military take-over, more importantly, led to the relegation of long-term development strategies in favour of short-term political capital which would pacify belligerent political interests. By removing politics from the workings of the economy, then, neoliberal reform and the 'internationalisation' of the state also removed the potential for influence from the interests which formerly had stymied attempts at economic restructuring. In this sense, the policy-making arena in which these interests had formerly been active was eliminated through the removal of control from the state itself, and in this way its 'insulation' from societal pressures (according to the conception outlined earlier) was enhanced.
Moreover, globalisation generated a redefinition of the nature of state-society compromises as well as of the capital-labour nexus in both specific national settings and in a more global context. As global interdependence is deepened and expanded, the preferences of certain actors become both more decisive and also more congruent with the overall policy goals of the globalising political economy and reforming states (such as Argentina, Peru, Mexico and most other Latin American countries). As such, the weight and importance of actors with foreign ties is increased with the imperatives of constructing competitive transnational linkages, and the range of interests that are likely to benefit from the state's liberalisation policies expands. 25 The interests with foreign ties are likely to be business and the private sector, technocratic policy-makers and financial agents. The upshot is that the construction of a support coalition based on a nexus between the state and business is essential to the stability and survival of 'neoliberal democracy' in Latin American countries. 26 Therefore, the effects of globalisation are principally to alter the constellation of interests and the nature of the support coalitions that governments need to court in the interests of international competitiveness and credibility. The changes in the international economy and financial system associated with globalisation act to significantly increase the influence and power of the forces that favour liberalisation in the domestic (and international) setting. 27 However, the imperative for the government to privilege business interests over, for example, labour, is reinforced by the dangers of not doing so. Globalisation acts to increase the mobility of capital and, as a result, the 'exit option' of the mobile capital asset holders in the domestic economy. 28 Having experienced the impact of capital flight, Latin American governments in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, particularly, were aware of the need to take the interests and preferences of these economic and financial agents seriously.
More subtle manifestations of the political influence of globalisation can be found in the points made earlier about the international 'rescue' of the state, which entails the external 'locking in' of a set of neoliberal economic policies. Once these policy measures have been implemented at the domestic level, they are accorded an element of irreversibility as a result of the interaction between domestic and international economic priorities. The upshot is the eventual removal of direct policy-making responsibility from the state, and this has significant implications for state-society relations. In effect, the state is relieved of its role as the principal arena for social and distributive conflict. A removal of authority from the state with respect to policymaking autonomy means a removal of the capacity for influence of societal interests.
This is formulated in stronger terms by neo-Gramscian analyses of what Stephen Gill
has termed a 'new constitutionalism'. According to this conception, the global system is dominated by 'a legal and political strategy for separating economic forces and policies from broad political accountability, securing management of the economy in the hands of central bankers and technocrats responsive to transnational capital'. 29 Similarly for Robert Cox, the 'internationalisation of the state' is seen to '[give] precedence to certain state agencies -notably ministries of finance and prime ministers' offices -which are key points in the adjustment of domestic to international economic policy'. 30 In the Latin American context, this internationalisation of the state as a cumulative result of recent globalising tendencies in the international system has translated into an increase in the 'power' of the national state by our standards of centralisation and insulation. In addition, states were able to redefine relations with elements of society which formerly had stymied attempts at coherent and consistent macroeconomic policy management and the construction of politically viable coalitions.
In sum, the 'rescue' or 'internationalisation' of the nation-state did not entail a comprehensive reduction in the power of the national state, as is often assumed in the literature. Here we return to the 'paradox of state power'. The functions and capacities of the state were propelled through a process of redefinition by the forces of globalisation and international change. Although the removal of direct policy-making functions from the state to the international (and regional) levels is manifest, this created the conditions in which the state could re-invent and strengthen itself at the domestic level, through a recovery of legitimacy and coherence and, as argued above, through an increasing insulation from societal interests. In this way, the state became able to pursue its functions in a situation of increased political stability, and to implement a set of preferences which, crucially, were entirely consistent with the 'interests' of the globalised international system.
More broadly, globalisation has the impact of weakening its opponents at both the international and national levels. This could be conceptualised in semi-structuralist terms which would perceive a long-term trend towards the weakening of those societal forces that are opposed to the interests of global capital. Hyperinflation and domestic economic crisis produced by the prevalence of these interests in policy-making circles (including the Alfonsín government in Argentina and the García government in Peru) in turn are destructive of interests hostile to globalisation. This, then, further explains the 'paradox of state power': it conflates the less autonomous state in international terms and the stronger state in domestic terms into a single logic relating to a damaging dysfunction between local and international sources of power.
Policy responses
The concept of the 'competition state' was presented above as one of the most recent 
Concluding perspectives
The 'paradox of state power' contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on the development of the state in an era of the globalisation of economic and political interchanges. Other literature has focused on the issue of national sovereignty more directly, or else on the power balance between states and non-state actors, or else on more general issues of global governance. This paper sought to add another theoretical perspective and an additional empirical dimension to these ongoing debates. It offers a conception of state power which focuses on the states' policy-making capacity, particularly following instances of breakdown in its political and economic legitimacy or coherence. The case of Latin American countries in the post-crisis 1990s was used as an illustration. In effect, the increased engagement of such countries at the global and regional levels, the network of commitments and obligations constructed in these arena, and the surrender of a significant degree of policy-making latitude as a result had the paradoxical effect of 'strengthening' the national state at the domestic level.
Crucially, this process of engagement was a result of purposive government strategies.
This observation runs counter to hang-over notions that see such policy change as consequent upon the insistence of international financial institutions and the imposition of external preferences. While it is clear that governments had few feasible policy options available to them, the notion that neoliberal restructuring and increased integration at the international level were results of external obligation ignore important dimensions of the processes of change underway at the domestic level in Latin American countries, which generated the possibilities for a coincidence of interests between national states and the agents of the international political economy.
The role of the national state can therefore be approached in a number of different ways. Clearly globalisation has altered the ways in which states are able to exercise authority, and the dimensions of economic and social life over which they have meaningful control. Economic globalisation produced a marked reduction in both the regulatory role and capacity of states as a result of the processes of deregulation and liberalisation necessary for participation in the global economy. In this sense, the process of globalisation has produced a shift in the capacities of national states and in the nature of state power which amounts frequently to a form of 'governance without we dispense with the assumption that a process which occurs in the territory of a national state is necessarily a national process. 38 The processes and results of globalisation may be inherently transnational in nature, but there is no necessary incompatibility between this and the argument that these processes of transnationalisation or internationalisation remain effectively located in the institutional structure of the national state. The latter should not be misrepresented as the antithesis of the international or the global, but rather as a form of authority which is increasingly (although still unevenly and often incompletely) re-oriented towards and inserted into the new processes and power structures associated with the globalised international economy.
The global economic crisis has unleashed a new momentum in the dynamics under observation by students of globalisation and IPE. It is precisely the global and regional linkages constructed by states in recent years that are likely to be called into question, or else to disintegrate, as a result of the difficulties currently being experienced in large parts of the world. If the emerging system of global economic and political governance was based on a policy consensus and on an acceptance of the new 'rules of the game' implied by globalisation, then the crisis has swept the rug from under contemporary conceptions of global order and the development of the global economy. It is perhaps inevitable that the result will be an atomisation (or perhaps 'nationalisation') of policy responses and an exacerbation of tendencies towards 'fragmentation' (as opposed to 'integration') in global and regional terms. These outcomes cast further shadow over the convergence debate. Given the current vilification of international financial institutions in the light of the Asian experiences, the contention that the countries and agents of the world economy are converging on a single policy and ideological position rings increasingly hollow, and appears untenable even on the basis of early evidence.
